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Group Legal Services: The Bench, the Bar,
and the Brotherhood
I. INTRODUCTION

The bar has long sought to make legal services readily available
to all persons whatever their situation. Thus, the bar has sponsored
legal aid societies and lawyer referral systems, and has promoted
neighborhood law offices. These methods all meet the bar's traditional
individualistic view that the attorney-client relationship should be
direct without any third party interference.
However, the lay public, often bewildered by a myriad of unfamilar
names in the yellow pages, continues to seek means of securing legal
services more cheaply, more efficiently, and more reliably.1 Group
legal services-whereby an organized group procures legal services
for its individual members-are one such means.
Certainly an association can employ a lawyer to handle the legal
affairs of the association as an entity. However, the employmentand even the recommendation-of lawyers by an organization to
represent its individual members in their individual affairs has been
strongly opposed by the bar and by the courts. Such action, making
the organization a lay intermediary between the lawyer and the individual client, has been characterized as the unauthorized practice
of law;2 and the lawyers employed or recommended by the group
have been condemned for violation of the standards of professional
conduct.3 It is the purpose of this note to consider whether this condemnation can stand after the recent decisions by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the cases of NAACP v. Button4 and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar.II. TYPEs OF GRouP LEGAL SmiCEs
Group legal services fall into two general categories: first,
services designed to effectuate a group purpose, and second, services
1. See, e.g., Special Committee on Group Legal Services, Rep., 35 CALIF. S.B.J. 710
(1960); 34 CALIF. S.B.J. 318 (1959).
2. For a good discussion of the grounds of objections to lay intermediaries, see
Judge Roger Traynor's dissent in Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 CAL. 2d 504, 225 P.2d
508, 518 (1950).
3. Canon 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits the exploitation or
control of a lawyer's services by a lay intermediary. Canons 27 and 28 condemn
solicitation by the lawyer himself, or knowing acquiescense in solicitation by others
for him. Canon 47 bars a lawyer from aiding the unauthorized practice of law by
any lay agency, personal or corporate.

4. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
5. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).

Supported by an amicus curiae brief of the American Bar

Association, Virginia petitioned for rehearing, which petition was denied, 377 U.S.
960 (1964).
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designed for the benefit of the individuals. Group-purpose services
are services which aid the members of the group as a whole on some
common problem, or services provided to individuals which redound
directly to the benefit of all the members of the group. Individualbenefit services are those provided for individuals on their separate
legal problems, the solution of which will have no significant effect
on the legal rights of the rest of the members of the group. Thus,
the aiding of individual litigants by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in school desegregation
cases in order to advance the interests of Negroes as a whole is a
group-purpose service. In contrast, the provision of legal services to
its employees by a corporation as part of the employment contract is
an individual-benefit type of group legal service. Both types of group
legal services have been condemned by the courts.
For example, in People ex rel. Courtney v. Real Estate Taxpayers
Association,6 a nonprofit corporation, organized to alleviate the inequitable distribution of tax burdens on real estate in Illinois, brought
suits in the name of individual members to attack the validity of the
taxes. The court held that by employing lawyers to litigate suits for
its individual members the Association was engaged in the practice of
law; that the relationship of attorney and client did not exist between
the members of the Association and its attorneys; that a corporation
cannot practice law; and that the nonprofit nature of the Taxpayers
Association would not affect the result.
Individual-benefit group legal services have also experienced difficulty in the courts. For example, nonprofit automobile associations
have frequently tried to maintain arrangements whereby, in return
for annual membership fees, the club paid the legal expenses for
members charged with violation of traffic laws. These associations
usually either maintained their own legal departments or recommended approved lawyers with the member being allowed to choose
any lawyer he wished. Although accepted in England, such arrangements have almost uniformly been declared illegal in the United
States as being the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation
and the interruption of the attorney-client relationship by a lay
intermediary.7
6. 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); see Weihofen: "Practice of Law" by NonPecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 U. Cmi. L. Rtv. 119 (1934).
7. An arrangement whereby the club members could choose unlisted as well as
listed lawyers was approved in In re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d 749 (1936).
Numerous other cases, however, have struck down such arrangements whether the
lawyers were directly employed by the automobile clubs or not. American Automobile
Ass'n v. Merrick, 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Chicago Motor Club, 362 III. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 II. 595, 188 N.E. 827 (1933); In re Malclub of America,
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III. THE Button AND Railroad Trainmen CASES
Two recent Supreme Court cases, however, have undermined the
existing legal restrictions on group legal services. One case dealt
with group-purpose type services, the other with individual-benefit
type services.
A. NAACP v. Button
In 1956 as part of its massive resistance program to school integration, Virginia proscribed the solicitation of legal business for an
attorney by an organization not having a pecuniary right or liability
in the lawsuit. The NAACP, licensed to do business in Virginia as a
nonprofit association, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute
with respect to its activities in encouraging and financing school
desegregation suits by Negro parents. Mr. Justice Brennan in the
majority opinion declared that the activities of the NAACP were
modes of expression and association protected by the first and fourteenth amendments and could not be prohibited by Virginia under
its power to regulate the legal profession. "In the context of NAACP
objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences;
it is a means of achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment .... It is thus a form of political expression."8

For the purpose of the present inquiry the most important aspect
of the Button case was not the strildng down of this segment of
massive resistance to federal law but a digression in Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion. This digression cited several group legal services
cases, including the Courtney case, and opened the whole question
by deviously stating that the court intimated "no view one way or
the other as to the merits of those decisions with respect to the
particular arrangements against which they are directed."9
B. Brotherhoodof RailroadTrainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
VirginiaState Bar
In order to protect injured members from being induced by railroad claims adjusters to make inadequate settlements of Federal
Employers Liability Act'0 personal injury claims, and to insure
competent legal representation in these personal injury suits, the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen maintains a list of competent
personal injury lawyers, called regional attorneys. When a BrotherInc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); State ex rel. Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club,
Inc., 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936); see Weihofen, Practice of Law by lMotor
Clubs-Useful but Forbidden, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 296 (1936).
8. 371 U.S. at 429.
9. 371 U.S. at 442.
10. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
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hood member is injured on the job, a member of the legal aid bureau
immediately urges him not to settle his case without consulting a
lawyer and gives him the name of the regional attorney. In the
Railroad Trainmen case there was no evidence of any financial connection between the regional attorney and the Brotherhood and no
evidence of any control over the litigation exercised by the Brotherhood. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stressed the interest
of the union in protecting its members against the claims adjusters
and cited the difficulty and need of obtaining competent counsel to
oppose the experienced railroad lawyers. He stated that the first
amendment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly protected the Brotherhood members' right to assist and advise each other
in asserting their rights under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
And the right of the workers personally or through a special department of
their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance-and,
most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on-is an

inseparable part of this constitutionally guaranteed right to assist and
advise each other .... 11
The state can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative
plan to advise one another than it could use more direct means to bar them
from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to
petition the courts cannot be so handicapped. 12

And, according to Mr. Justice Black, Virginia had demonstrated no
"appreciable public interest" in preventing the Brotherhood plan.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Clark distinguished Button on the
grounds that personal injury litigation is not a form of political
expression. He warned, "By its decision today the Court overthrows
state regulation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of
law to the level of a commercial enterprise." 3
IV. SocIAL UTmrr

OF GRoUP LEGAL SERvicEs

Organizations to provide group-purpose legal services such as the
Real Estate Taxpayers Association and the NAACP are formed not
to engage in profit making activity, but to advance and secure
through litigation some common purpose of their members. Thus,
the Taxpayers Association was formed to achieve equitable taxation for the real estate property owners of Illinois; the NAACP
11. 377 U.S. at6 (1964).
12. Id. at 7. Brotherhood legal service arrangements had been struck down
previously in many state court decisions. E.g., In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
13 III. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); see Hildebrand v. State Bar, supra note 2;
Doughty v. Gills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (E.S. 1952); Student Symposium,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 387 (1959); 11 STAN. L. REv. 394 (1959).
13. 377 U.S. at 9.
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exists to prevent discriminatory treatment of Negroes. Such organizations can advance the interests of their members by lobbying for
favorable legislation, by extra-legal coercive activity such as boycotts
or civil demonstrations, or by litigation in the courts.
Our judicial system is such, however, that before a group can
engage in litigation, before a case can be brought, there must exist
an actual "case or controversy" and the prospective litigant must
have "standing to sue," that is, he must have a litigable interest.
Thus, the NAACP itself, cannot directly challenge the validity of
allegedly racially discriminatory laws or directly seek the enforcement
in the courts of the legal rights of Negroes. Nor could the Taxpayers
Association bring a suit in its own name attacking the constitutionality
of the 1929 Illinois tax assessments. The only manner in which
these organizations can judicially advance the common aims of their
members is by sponsoring litigation by individual litigants. And
such litigation is usually beyond the resources of individuals.
Organizations support legal action because individuals lack the necessary

time, money, and skill. With no delays a case takes an average of four

years to pass through two lower courts to the Supreme Court of the United
States. A series of cases on related questions affecting the permanent
interest of a group may extend over two decades or more .... Organizations

are better able to provide the continuity demanded in litigation than individuals. Some individuals do maintain responsibility for their own cases
even at the Supreme Court level, but this is difficult under modern
conditions. 14

The nine suits challenging the validity of the 1929 Illinois tax assessments would have cost an individual 200,000 dollars in attorneys'
fees, whereas the average cost to each Association member was a
little over fifteen dollars. Litigation is essentially a peace preserving
device. Often it is the only means by which a minority group can
secure and maintain their rights. These rights may be useless if their
only practical means of enforcement is precluded.
Individual-benefit type group legal services such as those sponsored
by the automobile clubs and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
also serve useful social functions. Such services provide a means of
spreading the costs of legal services among a large group similar to
a system of insurance. They may allow an individual to prosecute
or defend claims which would otherwise be too costly. For example,
in 1931 the average amount of the legal claims handled by the
Chicago Motor Club was twelve dollars and thirty-nine cents in civil
cases and two dollars and forty-five cents in traffic violation cases,
amounts so small that without the service it was not worth while for
14. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 20, 22 (1958).
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an individual to retain legal counsel. These arrangements also enable
individuals to secure lawyers readily and confidently. The legal aid
system devised by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was designed to ensure that its injured members were made aware of their
legal rights and to ensure that they would be able to obtain competent counsel.
Group legal services serve a useful purpose in our society. In the
past the courts have stubbornly applied almost indiscriminately to
all group legal services rigid, conceptualistic rules designed to prevent the commercial exploitation of the legal profession by profit
seeking corporations. 15 In their rigid application of these rules the
courts have generally refused to distinguish from the commercial
exploitation of legal services the case of nonprofit associations whose
sole aim is to secure better and more efficient legal services for their
members. The Supreme Court, however, has now drawn such a
distinction, and in the Button and Railroad Trainmen cases it ruled
that such activities by nonprofit groups are protected by the first
and fourteenth amendments. While the exact extent of these rulings
is still uncertain, it is clear that their effect is sweeping and that
previously existing legal doctrines and interpretations of codes of
ethics must now be drastically reshaped.

V. GENERAL LnrrAONS ON SomcrrAoN
It is submitted that the Button and Railroad Trainmen cases do not
provide constitutional protection for all solicitation arrangements. A
state has a legitimate interest in regulating the legal profession. If a
solicitation arrangement involves sufficient evils, the state may regulate and forbid it. Thus a state may constitutionally forbid solicitation
in the form of "ambulance chasing." A state should be able to prevent
a group from indiscriminately soliciting legal business from the public
at large for the sole purpose of enriching particular lawyers. It is
therefore submitted that to qualify for constitutional protection, a
solicitation arrangement should involve some sort of connection between the soliciting group and the persons solicited in order to raise
the arrangement above the level of officious intermeddling and 16the
mere channeling of legal business to enrich particular lawyers.
Thus in the Railroad Trainmen case the Brotherhood legal aid
15. Group medical services have been approved in such states as California,
Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272 P.2d

497 (1954), which has consistently refused to approve group legal services. See note
1 supra.

16. Such a restriction on solicitation would not prevent the formation of legal service
cooperatives since the purpose of the cooperative is to provide legal services for its

members, not to enrich particular lawyers. There is a community of interest among
the members of the cooperative to secure legal services for themselves.
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department would not have been allowed to urge non-union members
to employ certain lawyers because the necessary community of interest in the arrangement was lacking. In Button the court allowed
the NAACP to solicit non-NAACP members as clients for NAACP
lawyers. Perhaps the distinction here is that in Button (a grouppurpose case) the litigation itself, as a means of advancing the
interests of the group, was a form of political expression and therefore
constitutionally protected. In Railroad Trainmen (an individualbenefit case), as the dissent pointed out, the litigation itself was not
a means of political expression by the group as a whole and therefore
constitutionally protected under the rationale of Button. Instead
what was protected was the right of the group to associate together
and recommend lawyers to each other. In any event, the primary
purpose of the solicitation in both cases was not merely to channel
legal business to particular lawyers for their pecuniary enrichment.
VI. ANALYSIS OF GROUP-PURPOSE LEGAL SERVIcEs
One of the principal objections to lay intermediaries is that the lay
intermediary, rather than the client, may control the litigation and
favor its own interests rather than those of the individual client. Or,
even if there is no direct control, situations may arise where there is
a conflict of interest between the individual client and the lay agency
so that the lawyer will be torn by a divided allegiance. Canon 35,
therefore, prohibits the control or exploitation of a lawyer's services
by a lay intermediary.
Consider, however, the situation where the interests of the association supplying the legal services and the interests of the individual
litigant are identical. Here, there are no conflict of interest problems,
no dangers of control or divided allegiance. When a group supplies
legal services for its members on problems which affect the rights or
interests of the membership as a whole, the interests of the group
and the individual litigant will substantially coincide. In Courtney
the interests of the Taxpayers Association and the individual litigant
members were the same: to have the 1929 Illinois tax assessments
adjudged invalid. In Button the Court found that the community of
aims and interests between the NAACP and the individual litigants
obviated any significant conflict of interest dangers.
Obviously, however, there often exists the possibility that in a
particular case the aims and interests of the association and those of
the individual litigant might diverge. Thus, the state of Illinois might
have offered to compromise with an individual litigant taxpayer his
particular tax assessment in order not to have the overall assessment
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declared invalid. Or, Virginia might have offered to provide improved
schools for Negroes in place of desegregation.
However, in the case where a group is using litigation to advance
or protect the interests of the group as a whole, the individual litigant
is merely fulfilling a necessary formality. He is merely a figurehead
enabling the group to assert its rights in the courts through him. The
real party in interest is the group or association. Under a realistic
analysis the group is the true litigant. Just as an action by a shareholder against the directors of a corporation for misconduct must be
brought in the name of the corporation as the formally aggrieved
party; so must an association which forms an entity distinct from
its members bring an action in the name of an individual as the
formally aggrieved party.
Under this analysis such terms as "divided allegiance" and "control
of litigation by a lay intermediary" take on different significance. In
case of a divergence of interests between the individual litigant and
the group, the primary allegiance of the lawyer should be not to the
individual client, but rather to the association whose interests the
individual client represents. Similarly, the association should be allowed to control the litigation which it sponsors for individual clients
in order to further the interests of the combined membership. The
individual litigant can always withdraw his authorization to have the
suit instituted in his name. It would be manifestly unfair, however,
for one person, representing the aspirations of a group that has joined
together to accomplish what the members could not accomplish individually, to abuse his position, which has been sponsored by the
group as a whole, and attempt to reap personal gain with complete
disregard for the interests of the group or to dictate personally the
course of action the group should take.
A sharp qualification, however, must be made to the above analysis
in the situation where the interests of the individual and the group
are not identical. To a disadvantaged Negro group it makes little
difference, as far as furthering its interests, whether a suit is brought
to enjoin the segregation of restaurant facilities in an interstate bus
terminal or whether it defends trespass or breach of peace suits
brought against freedom riders attempting to desegregate the facilities. In both instances the group is advancing its interests in desegregation. But from the point of view of the individual litigant
the situations are quite different. If he loses the suit to enjoin
segregation, he may not be able to eat in a desegregated restaurant,
but he is generally no worse off than before he brought the suit. On
the other hand, if he loses the trespass suit, he may be subject to fine
and imprisonment. In the suit to enjoin discrimination the individual
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litigant and the group have substantially the same stake in the outcome-desegregation of the restaurant facilities. In the trespass suit,
however, the individual litigant has considerably more at stake than
the group-possible imprisonment.
In the suit to enjoin segregation, if the interests of the individual
and the group or association diverge and the association maintains
control of the litigation, the individual litigant loses little. He may
have to forego a compromise offer to desegregate certain days of the
week, if the association controls the litigation and demands complete
and immediate desegregation. But he is only the representative of
the group, nothing more; whatever he might have attained would
have been through the sponsorship and resources of the group.
In the trespass suit, however, a divergence of interests between the
individual and the group can be of more than little consequence to
the individual if the association controls the litigation. If the individual defendant is offered a suspended sentence in exchange for
a guilty plea, the group's legitimate interest may be to contest the
suit in the hope of gaining an acquittal. Clearly, no arrangement
should be countenanced whereby the group could control the litigation strategy in this situation. Nor should the lawyer owe anything
less to the individual client than undivided allegiance. Here the
individual litigant is more than a mere representative of the group;
he is more than just a necessary formality allowing the group to
achieve their purposes through a suit which it cannot bring in its
own name. Here unlike Button or Courtney, we cannot say that the
real party to the suit is the group. The individual litigant stands for
the group, but he stands in his own right also. Both the individual
and the group have the same general interest in the outcome of the
litigation, but the individual's interest is substantially greater than
that of the group. He shares the common interest of the group in the
outcome of the litigation (achieving desegregated facilities) but he
has in addition a substantial personal interest which is not directly
shared by the other members of the group (staying out of jail).
A perhaps useful, but certainly imperfect, analogy is the situation
where the lawyer for a liability insurance company defends the
insured in a personal injury action. Such arrangements are permitted
on the grounds of the public policy to encourage liability insurance.
The real defendant in the case is the insurance company, but unless
there is a direct action statute, the formal defendant is the insured.
Of course the interests of the insurance company and the insured
could vary substantially. For example, the plaintiff might offer to
settle within the policy limits. If the insurance company rejects this
offer, preferring to litgate, there exists the possibility that the ultimate
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recovery might exceed the policy limits, for which portion the insured
would be personally liable. Nevertheless, the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics has sanctioned such representation by the insurance company lawyer. 17 The committee based their decision on the
grounds that "the company and the insured are virtually at one in
their common interest" and the contractual relationship between the
insured and the insurer. On the issue of control, the insurance company "because of its contractual liability and community of interest,
shall take charge of the incidents of such defense including the
18
supervising of the litigation."

VII. ANALYSIS OF INDrmuAL-BENEFrr SERVICES
Individual-benefit type group legal services are legal services made
available by the group to its members concerning their individual
legal problems, the solution of which will have no significant effect
on the legal rights of the rest of the members of the group. Under
the Button and Railroad Trainmen holdings, an organization apparently may recommend to its members any lawyers it wishes. And
undoubtedly the Supreme Court will uphold the general right of
persons to associate together to pay their individual legal expenses.
These two cases necessitate a complete re-examination of the bar's
approach to individual-benefit services. The following suggestions
are made concerning these types of services.
Individual group legal service arrangements should be permitted
only where the group providing the services is a nonprofit organization. Such nonprofit organizations exist for the mutual benefit of
their members, to whom the services are provided. The objections to
the commercial exploitation of law by a profit-seeking lay intermediary are too well established to be recounted here.
Furthermore, if the individual client and not the group pays the
lawyer (as in the Railroad Trainmen arrangement), no sort of financial connection between the lawyer and the organization in the form
of fee splitting should be allowed. 19 Otherwise, the organization in
recommending a lawyer may be more influenced by the amount of
the fee the lawyer is willing to split with it than the competence of
the lawyer.
In all individual-benefit legal services the relationship between the
lawyer and the individual client should be direct and personal. The
17. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE Co.Lml=rEE ON PRoFEssIONAL ETmIcs AND GRIEVANCES

591 (1957).
18. Id. at 594.
19. Previous to the case of In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 11,
the regional counsel in each suit referred to them has paid the expenses of the Brother-

hood's legal aid department.
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individual client should communicate directly with the lawyer concerning his legal problem. As opposed to group-purpose services, in
individual-benefit services the group has no legitimate stake in the
outcome of any litigation or the content of any advice given. Thus,
the group should exercise absolutely no control over the legal services,
and the lawyer's primary-and only-duty must be directly to the
individual client.
In any situation where there exists the possibility of a significant
conflict of interest between the group and the individual concerning
the outcome of litigation or the content of advice, lawyers subject to
the control of the group should not be permitted to render the
services. The danger, of course, is that the lawyer will favor the
interests of the group instead of devoting his undivided loyalty to
his client. Thus, it is submitted that in the Railroad Trainmen
situation the Brotherhood should not be allowed to provide its own
lawyers to handle FELA cases for its members. For in such situations
a conflict of interest concerning the handling of the personal injury
suits might arise; for example, if the Brotherhood decided that it
wanted to reduce the amount of recoveries
in FELA suits in order
20
to enhance union-employer relations.
Finally, it is suggested that some sort of supervisory control be
devised for cooperatives formed to provide legal services in order to
assure that the association really is a cooperative arrangement and
to prevent unscrupulous promoters from taking advantage of the
members, for example through unreasonably high salaries. Also, such
cooperatives should be restricted to dealing with their own members.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Too often perhaps the prohibitions embodied in the legal profession's standards of professional ethics are regarded as absolutesimmutable no matter what the circumstances. Perhaps this inflexibility is simply the result of an ardent concern to stringently maintain
the high standards of conduct of the profession. Perhaps it is a holdover from the now rapidly being disfavored "conceptualistic theory
of law," which views the law simply as a series of formal, logical rules
to be applied with no consideration for the underlying policy bases of
the rules. Or, perhaps it is in some cases merely the result of the
economic self-interest of the profession.
These negative prohibitions of professional ethics are designed, not
to impose morality for the sake of morality, not to benefit the lawyers
themselves, but to enable the legal profession to more effectively
20. This would not prevent a labor union lawyer from dispensing legal services to
members on matters where no such possibility of conflict of interest exists.
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and honorably carry out its afflrnative duty to provide legal services
to the public. As stated so forcefully by Judge Roger Traynor in a
previous case involving the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen:
Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public, the
rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be directed at
the performance of the duty. Canons of ethics that would operate to deny
to the railroad employees the effective legal assistance they need can be
justified only if such a denial is necessary to suppress professional conduct
that in other cases would be injurious to the effective discharge of the
profession's duties to the public.21

With respect to group legal services the leadership of the bar has
lagged. Now by constitutional mandate the Supreme Court has

thrown the door wide open to group legal services. It is possible that
under the Constitution the Supreme Court may now exercise even

more extensive control of professional matters previously assumed to
be entirely within the control of the states and the profession. The

bar must adopt a forward looking approach to group legal services
and their role in our society and fashion new, progressive standards
in this area.2
21. Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225 P.2d 508, 519 (1950).
22. For another stand in favor of group legal services see Dmuum, LEGAL ETHics
(1953).

